Daily Papers

In this study, we explore the robustness of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) against Byzantine failures, where any agent can enact arbitrary, worst-case actions due to malfunction or adversarial attack. To address the uncertainty that any agent can be adversarial, we propose a Bayesian Adversarial Robust Dec-POMDP (BARDec-POMDP) framework, which views Byzantine adversaries as nature-dictated types, represented by a separate transition. This allows agents to learn policies grounded on their posterior beliefs about the type of other agents, fostering collaboration with identified allies and minimizing vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We define the optimal solution to the BARDec-POMDP as an ex post robust Bayesian Markov perfect equilibrium, which we proof to exist and weakly dominates the equilibrium of previous robust MARL approaches. To realize this equilibrium, we put forward a two-timescale actor-critic algorithm with almost sure convergence under specific conditions. Experimentation on matrix games, level-based foraging and StarCraft II indicate that, even under worst-case perturbations, our method successfully acquires intricate micromanagement skills and adaptively aligns with allies, demonstrating resilience against non-oblivious adversaries, random allies, observation-based attacks, and transfer-based attacks.

Modern ML applications increasingly rely on complex deep learning models and large datasets. There has been an exponential growth in the amount of computation needed to train the largest models. Therefore, to scale computation and data, these models are inevitably trained in a distributed manner in clusters of nodes, and their updates are aggregated before being applied to the model. However, a distributed setup is prone to Byzantine failures of individual nodes, components, and software. With data augmentation added to these settings, there is a critical need for robust and efficient aggregation systems. We define the quality of workers as reconstruction ratios in (0,1], and formulate aggregation as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure using Beta densities. We show that the Regularized form of log-likelihood wrt subspace can be approximately solved using iterative least squares solver, and provide convergence guarantees using recent Convex Optimization landscape results. Our empirical findings demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the robustness of state-of-the-art Byzantine resilient aggregators. We evaluate our method in a distributed setup with a parameter server, and show simultaneous improvements in communication efficiency and accuracy across various tasks. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/hamidralmasi/FlagAggregator

In multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs),mobile nodes cooperate with each other without using any infrastructure such as access points or base stations. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Among the various attacks to which MANETs are vulnerable, malicious packet dropping attack is very common where a malicious node can partially degrade or completely disrupt communication in the network by consistently dropping packets. In this paper, a mechanism for detection of packet dropping attack is presented based on cooperative participation of the nodes in a MANET. The redundancy of routing information in an ad hoc network is utilized to make the scheme robust so that it works effectively even in presence of transient network partitioning and Byzantine failure of nodes. The proposed scheme is fully cooperative and thus more secure as the vulnerabilities of any election algorithm used for choosing a subset of nodes for cooperation are absent. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the protocol.

Byzantine robustness has received significant attention recently given its importance for distributed and federated learning. In spite of this, we identify severe flaws in existing algorithms even when the data across the participants is identically distributed. First, we show realistic examples where current state of the art robust aggregation rules fail to converge even in the absence of any Byzantine attackers. Secondly, we prove that even if the aggregation rules may succeed in limiting the influence of the attackers in a single round, the attackers can couple their attacks across time eventually leading to divergence. To address these issues, we present two surprisingly simple strategies: a new robust iterative clipping procedure, and incorporating worker momentum to overcome time-coupled attacks. This is the first provably robust method for the standard stochastic optimization setting. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/epfml/byzantine-robust-optimizer.

Federated learning has exhibited vulnerabilities to Byzantine attacks, where the Byzantine attackers can send arbitrary gradients to a central server to destroy the convergence and performance of the global model. A wealth of robust AGgregation Rules (AGRs) have been proposed to defend against Byzantine attacks. However, Byzantine clients can still circumvent robust AGRs when data is non-Identically and Independently Distributed (non-IID). In this paper, we first reveal the root causes of performance degradation of current robust AGRs in non-IID settings: the curse of dimensionality and gradient heterogeneity. In order to address this issue, we propose GAS, a \shorten approach that can successfully adapt existing robust AGRs to non-IID settings. We also provide a detailed convergence analysis when the existing robust AGRs are combined with GAS. Experiments on various real-world datasets verify the efficacy of our proposed GAS. The implementation code is provided in https://github.com/YuchenLiu-a/byzantine-gas.

Many areas of deep learning benefit from using increasingly larger neural networks trained on public data, as is the case for pre-trained models for NLP and computer vision. Training such models requires a lot of computational resources (e.g., HPC clusters) that are not available to small research groups and independent researchers. One way to address it is for several smaller groups to pool their computational resources together and train a model that benefits all participants. Unfortunately, in this case, any participant can jeopardize the entire training run by sending incorrect updates, deliberately or by mistake. Training in presence of such peers requires specialized distributed training algorithms with Byzantine tolerance. These algorithms often sacrifice efficiency by introducing redundant communication or passing all updates through a trusted server, making it infeasible to apply them to large-scale deep learning, where models can have billions of parameters. In this work, we propose a novel protocol for secure (Byzantine-tolerant) decentralized training that emphasizes communication efficiency.

Federated learning (FL) is a privacy-friendly type of machine learning where devices locally train a model on their private data and typically communicate model updates with a server. In decentralized FL (DFL), peers communicate model updates with each other instead. However, DFL is challenging since (1) the training data possessed by different peers is often non-i.i.d. (i.e., distributed differently between the peers) and (2) malicious, or Byzantine, attackers can share arbitrary model updates with other peers to subvert the training process. We address these two challenges and present Bristle, middleware between the learning application and the decentralized network layer. Bristle leverages transfer learning to predetermine and freeze the non-output layers of a neural network, significantly speeding up model training and lowering communication costs. To securely update the output layer with model updates from other peers, we design a fast distance-based prioritizer and a novel performance-based integrator. Their combined effect results in high resilience to Byzantine attackers and the ability to handle non-i.i.d. classes. We empirically show that Bristle converges to a consistent 95% accuracy in Byzantine environments, outperforming all evaluated baselines. In non-Byzantine environments, Bristle requires 83% fewer iterations to achieve 90% accuracy compared to state-of-the-art methods. We show that when the training classes are non-i.i.d., Bristle significantly outperforms the accuracy of the most Byzantine-resilient baselines by 2.3x while reducing communication costs by 90%.

Despite growing enthusiasm for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), where multiple LLM agents collaborate to accomplish tasks, their performance gains across popular benchmarks remain minimal compared to single-agent frameworks. This gap highlights the need to analyze the challenges hindering MAS effectiveness. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive study of MAS challenges. We analyze five popular MAS frameworks across over 150 tasks, involving six expert human annotators. We identify 14 unique failure modes and propose a comprehensive taxonomy applicable to various MAS frameworks. This taxonomy emerges iteratively from agreements among three expert annotators per study, achieving a Cohen's Kappa score of 0.88. These fine-grained failure modes are organized into 3 categories, (i) specification and system design failures, (ii) inter-agent misalignment, and (iii) task verification and termination. To support scalable evaluation, we integrate MASFT with LLM-as-a-Judge. We also explore if identified failures could be easily prevented by proposing two interventions: improved specification of agent roles and enhanced orchestration strategies. Our findings reveal that identified failures require more complex solutions, highlighting a clear roadmap for future research. We open-source our dataset and LLM annotator.

Privacy-preserving federated learning allows multiple users to jointly train a model with coordination of a central server. The server only learns the final aggregation result, thus the users' (private) training data is not leaked from the individual model updates. However, keeping the individual updates private allows malicious users to perform Byzantine attacks and degrade the accuracy without being detected. Best existing defenses against Byzantine workers rely on robust rank-based statistics, e.g., median, to find malicious updates. However, implementing privacy-preserving rank-based statistics is nontrivial and not scalable in the secure domain, as it requires sorting all individual updates. We establish the first private robustness check that uses high break point rank-based statistics on aggregated model updates. By exploiting randomized clustering, we significantly improve the scalability of our defense without compromising privacy. We leverage our statistical bounds in zero-knowledge proofs to detect and remove malicious updates without revealing the private user updates. Our novel framework, zPROBE, enables Byzantine resilient and secure federated learning. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that zPROBE provides a low overhead solution to defend against state-of-the-art Byzantine attacks while preserving privacy.

The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.

Recent studies have revealed that self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems frequently lead to widespread outages, which are challenging to contain and recover from. Existing failure detection techniques struggle to expose such failures prior to deployment, as they typically require a complex combination of specific conditions to be triggered. This challenge stems from the inherent nature of cascading failures, as they typically involve a sequence of fault propagations, each activated by distinct conditions. This paper presents CSnake, a fault injection framework to expose self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems. CSnake uses the novel idea of causal stitching, which causally links multiple single-fault injections in different tests to simulate complex fault propagation chains. To identify these chains, CSnake designs a counterfactual causality analysis of fault propagations - fault causality analysis (FCA): FCA compares the execution trace of a fault injection run with its corresponding profile run (i.e., same test w/o the injection) and identifies any additional faults triggered, which are considered to have a causal relationship with the injected fault. To address the large search space of fault and workload combinations, CSnake employs a three-phase allocation protocol of test budget that prioritizes faults with unique and diverse causal consequences, increasing the likelihood of uncovering conditional fault propagations. Furthermore, to avoid incorrectly connecting fault propagations from workloads with incompatible conditions, CSnake performs a local compatibility check that approximately checks the compatibility of the path constraints associated with connected fault propagations with low overhead. CSnake detected 15 bugs that cause self-sustaining cascading failures in five systems, five of which have been confirmed with two fixed.

Message passing graph neural networks (GNNs) would appear to be powerful tools to learn distributed algorithms via gradient descent, but generate catastrophically incorrect predictions when nodes update asynchronously during inference. This failure under asynchrony effectively excludes these architectures from many potential applications, such as learning local communication policies between resource-constrained agents in, e.g., robotic swarms or sensor networks. In this work we explore why this failure occurs in common GNN architectures, and identify "implicitly-defined" GNNs as a class of architectures which is provably robust to partially asynchronous "hogwild" inference, adapting convergence guarantees from work in asynchronous and distributed optimization, e.g., Bertsekas (1982); Niu et al. (2011). We then propose a novel implicitly-defined GNN architecture, which we call an energy GNN. We show that this architecture outperforms other GNNs from this class on a variety of synthetic tasks inspired by multi-agent systems, and achieves competitive performance on real-world datasets.

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered multi-agent systems (MAS) have rapidly advanced collaborative reasoning, tool use, and role-specialized coordination in complex tasks. However, reliability-critical deployment remains hindered by a systemic failure mode: hierarchical compliance under instruction conflicts (system-user, peer-peer), where agents misprioritize system-level rules in the presence of competing demands. Moreover, widely used macro-level metrics (e.g., pass@k) obscure these micro-level violations and offer little actionable guidance for remedy. In this work, we present a full-stack, three-stage framework: (1) Diagnose - Contextualized Role Adherence Score (CRAS), a query-wise, context-aware scoring metric that decomposes role adherence into four measurable dimensions; (2) Localize - attention drift analysis revealing that instruction conflicts are resolved by attention heads that are largely concentrated in middle layers; (3) Align - Surgical Alignment of Instruction Layers (SAIL), which installs LoRA only on the localized focal layers and optimizes a token-weighted DPO-style preference objective that credits tokens by their focal attentional contribution. Across standard benchmarks and MAS frameworks, our surgical approach improves instruction hierarchy compliance (e.g., +5.60% with AutoGen on MedQA) without full-model finetuning.

We introduce SWE-Bench Pro, a substantially more challenging benchmark that builds upon the best practices of SWE-BENCH [25], but is explicitly designed to capture realistic, complex, enterprise-level problems beyond the scope of SWE-BENCH. SWE-BENCH PRO contains 1,865 problems sourced from a diverse set of 41 actively maintained repositories spanning business applications, B2B services, and developer tools. The benchmark is partitioned into a public set with open access to problems sourced from 11 repositories, a held-out set of 12 repositories and a commercial set of 18 proprietary repositories where we have formal partnership agreements with early-stage startups. Problems in the held-out and the commercial set are not publicly accessible, but we release results on the commercial set. Our benchmark features long-horizon tasks that may require hours to days for a professional software engineer to complete, often involving patches across multiple files and substantial code modifications. All tasks are human-verified and augmented with sufficient context to ensure resolvability. In our evaluation of widely used coding models, under a unified scaffold, we observe that their performance on SWE-Bench PRO remains below 25% (Pass@1), with GPT-5 achieving the highest score to date at 23.3%. To better understand these limitations, we cluster the failure modes observed in the collected agent trajectories for a clearer characterization of the error patterns exhibited by current models. Overall, SWE-BENCH PRO provides a contamination-resistant testbed that more faithfully captures the complexity and diversity of real-world software development, advancing the pursuit of truly autonomous software engineering agents at a professional level.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

Agentic systems consisting of multiple LLM-driven agents coordinating through tools and structured interactions, are increasingly deployed for complex reasoning and problem-solving tasks. At the same time, emerging low-code and template-based agent development platforms (e.g., Dify) enable users to rapidly build and orchestrate agentic systems, which we refer to as platform-orchestrated agentic systems. However, these systems are also fragile and it remains unclear how to systematically identify their potential failure root cause. This paper presents a study of root cause identification of these platform-orchestrated agentic systems. To support this initiative, we construct a dataset AgentFail containing 307 failure logs from ten agentic systems, each with fine-grained annotations linking failures to their root causes. We additionally utilize counterfactual reasoning-based repair strategy to ensure the reliability of the annotation. Building on the dataset, we develop a taxonomy that characterizes failure root causes and analyze their distribution across different platforms and task domains. Furthermore, we introduce a benchmark that leverages LLMs for automatically identifying root causes, in which we also utilize the proposed taxonomy as guidance for LLMs. Results show that the taxonomy can largely improve the performance, thereby confirming its utility. Nevertheless, the accuracy of root cause identification reaches at most 33.6%, which indicates that this task still remains challenging. In light of these results, we also provide actionable guidelines for building such agentic systems. In summary, this paper provides a reliable dataset of failure root cause for platform-orchestrated agentic systems, corresponding taxonomy and benchmark, which serves as a foundation for advancing the development of more reliable agentic systems.

Deployed multimodal systems can fail in ways that evaluators did not anticipate. In order to find these failures before deployment, we introduce MultiMon, a system that automatically identifies systematic failures -- generalizable, natural-language descriptions of patterns of model failures. To uncover systematic failures, MultiMon scrapes a corpus for examples of erroneous agreement: inputs that produce the same output, but should not. It then prompts a language model (e.g., GPT-4) to find systematic patterns of failure and describe them in natural language. We use MultiMon to find 14 systematic failures (e.g., "ignores quantifiers") of the CLIP text-encoder, each comprising hundreds of distinct inputs (e.g., "a shelf with a few/many books"). Because CLIP is the backbone for most state-of-the-art multimodal systems, these inputs produce failures in Midjourney 5.1, DALL-E, VideoFusion, and others. MultiMon can also steer towards failures relevant to specific use cases, such as self-driving cars. We see MultiMon as a step towards evaluation that autonomously explores the long tail of potential system failures. Code for MULTIMON is available at https://github.com/tsb0601/MultiMon.

We present DAG-Rider, the first asynchronous Byzantine Atomic Broadcast protocol that achieves optimal resilience, optimal amortized communication complexity, and optimal time complexity. DAG-Rider is post-quantum safe and ensures that all messages proposed by correct processes eventually get decided. We construct DAG-Rider in two layers: In the first layer, processes reliably broadcast their proposals and build a structured Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the communication among them. In the second layer, processes locally observe their DAGs and totally order all proposals with no extra communication.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly capable of tackling complex real-world tasks, yet their reliance on inter-agent coordination, tool use, and long-horizon reasoning makes error recognition particularly challenging. Minor errors can propagate across agents, escalating into task failures while producing long, intertwined execution trajectories that impose significant costs for both human developers and automated systems to debug and analyze. Our key insight is that, despite surface differences in failure trajectories (e.g., logs), MAS errors often recur with similar structural patterns. This paper presents CORRECT, the first lightweight, training-free framework that leverages an online cache of distilled error schemata to recognize and transfer knowledge of failure structures across new requests. This cache-based reuse allows LLMs to perform targeted error localization at inference time, avoiding the need for expensive retraining while adapting to dynamic MAS deployments in subseconds. To support rigorous study in this domain, we also introduce CORRECT-Error, a large-scale dataset of over 2,000 annotated trajectories collected through a novel error-injection pipeline guided by real-world distributions, and further validated through human evaluation to ensure alignment with natural failure patterns. Experiments across seven diverse MAS applications show that CORRECT improves step-level error localization up to 19.8% over existing advances while at near-zero overhead, substantially narrowing the gap between automated and human-level error recognition.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agentic systems, often comprising multiple models, complex tool invocations, and orchestration protocols, substantially outperform monolithic agents. Yet this very sophistication amplifies their fragility, making them more prone to system failure. Pinpointing the specific agent or step responsible for an error within long execution traces defines the task of agentic system failure attribution. Current state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, however, remain strikingly inadequate for this challenge, with accuracy generally below 10%. To address this gap, we propose AgenTracer, the first automated framework for annotating failed multi-agent trajectories via counterfactual replay and programmed fault injection, producing the curated dataset TracerTraj. Leveraging this resource, we develop AgenTracer-8B, a lightweight failure tracer trained with multi-granular reinforcement learning, capable of efficiently diagnosing errors in verbose multi-agent interactions. On the Who&When benchmark, AgenTracer-8B outperforms giant proprietary LLMs like Gemini-2.5-Pro and Claude-4-Sonnet by up to 18.18%, setting a new standard in LLM agentic failure attribution. More importantly, AgenTracer-8B delivers actionable feedback to off-the-shelf multi-agent systems like MetaGPT and MaAS with 4.8-14.2% performance gains, empowering self-correcting and self-evolving agentic AI.

Autonomous agent systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating complex tasks. However, current evaluations largely rely on success rates without systematically analyzing the interactions, communication mechanisms, and failure causes within these systems. To bridge this gap, we present a benchmark of 34 representative programmable tasks designed to rigorously assess autonomous agents. Using this benchmark, we evaluate three popular open-source agent frameworks combined with two LLM backbones, observing a task completion rate of approximately 50%. Through in-depth failure analysis, we develop a three-tier taxonomy of failure causes aligned with task phases, highlighting planning errors, task execution issues, and incorrect response generation. Based on these insights, we propose actionable improvements to enhance agent planning and self-diagnosis capabilities. Our failure taxonomy, together with mitigation advice, provides an empirical foundation for developing more robust and effective autonomous agent systems in the future.

Federated Learning (FL) allows multiple participating clients to train machine learning models collaboratively while keeping their datasets local and only exchanging the gradient or model updates with a coordinating server. Existing FL protocols are vulnerable to attacks that aim to compromise data privacy and/or model robustness. Recently proposed defenses focused on ensuring either privacy or robustness, but not both. In this paper, we focus on simultaneously achieving differential privacy (DP) and Byzantine robustness for cross-silo FL, based on the idea of learning from history. The robustness is achieved via client momentum, which averages the updates of each client over time, thus reducing the variance of the honest clients and exposing the small malicious perturbations of Byzantine clients that are undetectable in a single round but accumulate over time. In our initial solution DP-BREM, DP is achieved by adding noise to the aggregated momentum, and we account for the privacy cost from the momentum, which is different from the conventional DP-SGD that accounts for the privacy cost from the gradient. Since DP-BREM assumes a trusted server (who can obtain clients' local models or updates), we further develop the final solution called DP-BREM+, which achieves the same DP and robustness properties as DP-BREM without a trusted server by utilizing secure aggregation techniques, where DP noise is securely and jointly generated by the clients. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that our proposed protocols achieve better privacy-utility tradeoff and stronger Byzantine robustness than several baseline methods, under different DP budgets and attack settings.

Federated Learning (FL) enables clients to collaboratively train a global model using their local datasets while reinforcing data privacy. However, FL is susceptible to poisoning attacks. Existing defense mechanisms assume that clients' data are independent and identically distributed (IID), making them ineffective in real-world applications where data are non-IID. This paper presents FedCLEAN, the first defense capable of filtering attackers' model updates in a non-IID FL environment. The originality of FedCLEAN is twofold. First, it relies on a client confidence score derived from the reconstruction errors of each client's model activation maps for a given trigger set, with reconstruction errors obtained by means of a Conditional Variational Autoencoder trained according to a novel server-side strategy. Second, we propose an ad-hoc trust propagation algorithm based on client scores, which allows building a cluster of benign clients while flagging potential attackers. Experimental results on the datasets MNIST and FashionMNIST demonstrate the robustness of FedCLEAN against Byzantine attackers in non-IID scenarios and a close-to-zero benign client misclassification rate, even in the absence of an attack.

Software engineers develop, fine-tune, and deploy deep learning (DL) models. They use and re-use models in a variety of development frameworks and deploy them on a range of runtime environments. In this diverse ecosystem, engineers use DL model converters to move models from frameworks to runtime environments. However, errors in converters can compromise model quality and disrupt deployment. The failure frequency and failure modes of DL model converters are unknown. In this paper, we conduct the first failure analysis on DL model converters. Specifically, we characterize failures in model converters associated with ONNX (Open Neural Network eXchange). We analyze past failures in the ONNX converters in two major DL frameworks, PyTorch and TensorFlow. The symptoms, causes, and locations of failures (for N=200 issues), and trends over time are also reported. We also evaluate present-day failures by converting 8,797 models, both real-world and synthetically generated instances. The consistent result from both parts of the study is that DL model converters commonly fail by producing models that exhibit incorrect behavior: 33% of past failures and 8% of converted models fell into this category. Our results motivate future research on making DL software simpler to maintain, extend, and validate.

Text-guided diffusion models (TDMs) are widely applied but can fail unexpectedly. Common failures include: (i) natural-looking text prompts generating images with the wrong content, or (ii) different random samples of the latent variables that generate vastly different, and even unrelated, outputs despite being conditioned on the same text prompt. In this work, we aim to study and understand the failure modes of TDMs in more detail. To achieve this, we propose SAGE, the first adversarial search method on TDMs that systematically explores the discrete prompt space and the high-dimensional latent space, to automatically discover undesirable behaviors and failure cases in image generation. We use image classifiers as surrogate loss functions during searching, and employ human inspections to validate the identified failures. For the first time, our method enables efficient exploration of both the discrete and intricate human language space and the challenging latent space, overcoming the gradient vanishing problem. Then, we demonstrate the effectiveness of SAGE on five widely used generative models and reveal four typical failure modes: (1) We find a variety of natural text prompts that generate images failing to capture the semantics of input texts. We further discuss the underlying causes and potential solutions based on the results. (2) We find regions in the latent space that lead to distorted images independent of the text prompt, suggesting that parts of the latent space are not well-structured. (3) We also find latent samples that result in natural-looking images unrelated to the text prompt, implying a possible misalignment between the latent and prompt spaces. (4) By appending a single adversarial token embedding to any input prompts, we can generate a variety of specified target objects. Project page: https://sage-diffusion.github.io/

Fully decentralized learning enables the distribution of learning resources and decision-making capabilities across multiple user devices or nodes, and is rapidly gaining popularity due to its privacy-preserving and decentralized nature. Importantly, this crowdsourcing of the learning process allows the system to continue functioning even if some nodes are affected or disconnected. In a disaster scenario, communication infrastructure and centralized systems may be disrupted or completely unavailable, hindering the possibility of carrying out standard centralized learning tasks in these settings. Thus, fully decentralized learning can help in this case. However, transitioning from centralized to peer-to-peer communications introduces a dependency between the learning process and the topology of the communication graph among nodes. In a disaster scenario, even peer-to-peer communications are susceptible to abrupt changes, such as devices running out of battery or getting disconnected from others due to their position. In this study, we investigate the effects of various disruptions to peer-to-peer communications on decentralized learning in a disaster setting. We examine the resilience of a decentralized learning process when a subset of devices drop from the process abruptly. To this end, we analyze the difference between losing devices holding data, i.e., potential knowledge, vs. devices contributing only to the graph connectivity, i.e., with no data. Our findings on a Barabasi-Albert graph topology, where training data is distributed across nodes in an IID fashion, indicate that the accuracy of the learning process is more affected by a loss of connectivity than by a loss of data. Nevertheless, the network remains relatively robust, and the learning process can achieve a good level of accuracy.

We describe WebSuite, the first diagnostic benchmark for generalist web agents, designed to systematically evaluate why agents fail. Advances in AI have led to the rise of numerous web agents that autonomously operate a browser to complete tasks. However, most existing benchmarks focus on strictly measuring whether an agent can or cannot complete a task, without giving insight on why. In this paper, we 1) develop a taxonomy of web actions to facilitate identifying common failure patterns, and 2) create an extensible benchmark suite to assess agents' performance on our taxonomized actions. This benchmark suite consists of both individual tasks, such as clicking a button, and end-to-end tasks, such as adding an item to a cart, and is designed such that any failure of a task can be attributed directly to a failure of a specific web action. We evaluate two popular generalist web agents, one text-based and one multimodal, and identify unique weaknesses for each agent. Because WebSuite can disaggregate task failures into specific action failures, this enables granular identification of which UX flows an individual agent has trouble with and immediately highlights promising avenues for improvement. These findings highlight the need for more focused benchmarking on where web agents go wrong to effectively improve agents beyond their weaker performance today.

In this paper we present the initial design of Minerva consensus protocol for Truechain and other technical details. Currently, it is widely believed in the blockchain community that a public chain cannot simultaneously achieve high performance, decentralization and security. This is true in the case of a Nakamoto chain (low performance) or a delegated proof of stake chain (partially centralized), which are the most popular block chain solutions at time of writing. Our consensus design enjoys the same consistency, liveness, transaction finality and security guarantee, a de-facto with the Hybrid Consensus. We go on to propose the idea of a new virtual machine on top of Ethereum which adds permissioned-chain based transaction processing capabilities in a permissionless setting. We also use the idea of data sharding and speculative transactions, and evaluation of smart contracts in a sharding friendly virtual machine. Finally, we will briefly discuss our fundamentally ASIC resistant mining algorithm, Truehash.

Training LLMs on decentralized and wimpy computation nodes, e.g., multiple on-spot instances, lowers the training cost and enables model democratization. The inevitable challenge here is the churn of nodes due to failures and the operator's scheduling policies, leading to losing a stage - a part of the model. The conventional approaches to recover from failures are to either use checkpointing, where periodically a copy of the entire model is sent to an additional storage, or redundant computation. These approaches yield significant communication and/or computation overhead even in non-failure cases and scale poorly in settings with large models. In this paper, we propose, CheckFree, an efficient recovery method where a failing stage is substituted by a weighted average of the closest neighboring stages. In contrast to the state of the art, CheckFree requires no additional computation or storage. However, because of the nature of averaging neighbouring stages, it can only recover failures of intermediate stages. We further extend our method to CheckFree+ with out-of-order pipeline execution to tolerate crashes of the first and last stages. Thanks to out-of-order pipelining, behaviour of those stages is mimicked by their neighboring ones, which allows CheckFree+ to recover them by simply copying the weights from the immediate neighbour. To be able to recover the (de)embedding layers, CheckFree+ copies those layers to the neighboring stages, which requires relatively small storage overhead. We extensively evaluate our method on LLaMa models of model sizes from 124M to 1.5B with varying failure frequencies. In the case of low and medium failure rates (5-10%), CheckFree and CheckFree+ outperform both checkpointing and redundant computation in terms of convergence in wall-clock time by over 12%. Both of our proposals can be run via our code available at: https://github.com/gensyn-ai/CheckFree.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

The automated generation of agentic workflows is a promising frontier for enabling large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks. However, our investigation reveals that the robustness of agentic workflow remains a critical, unaddressed challenge. Current methods often generate wildly inconsistent workflows when provided with instructions that are semantically identical but differently phrased. This brittleness severely undermines their reliability and trustworthiness for real-world applications. To quantitatively diagnose this instability, we propose metrics based on nodal and topological similarity to evaluate workflow consistency against common semantic variations such as paraphrasing and noise injection. Subsequently, we further propose a novel training framework, RobustFlow, that leverages preference optimization to teach models invariance to instruction variations. By training on sets of synonymous task descriptions, RobustFlow boosts workflow robustness scores to 70\% - 90\%, which is a substantial improvement over existing approaches. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/DEFENSE-SEU/RobustFlow.

AI scientist systems, capable of autonomously executing the full research workflow from hypothesis generation and experimentation to paper writing, hold significant potential for accelerating scientific discovery. However, the internal workflow of these systems have not been closely examined. This lack of scrutiny poses a risk of introducing flaws that could undermine the integrity, reliability, and trustworthiness of their research outputs. In this paper, we identify four potential failure modes in contemporary AI scientist systems: inappropriate benchmark selection, data leakage, metric misuse, and post-hoc selection bias. To examine these risks, we design controlled experiments that isolate each failure mode while addressing challenges unique to evaluating AI scientist systems. Our assessment of two prominent open-source AI scientist systems reveals the presence of several failures, across a spectrum of severity, which can be easily overlooked in practice. Finally, we demonstrate that access to trace logs and code from the full automated workflow enables far more effective detection of such failures than examining the final paper alone. We thus recommend journals and conferences evaluating AI-generated research to mandate submission of these artifacts alongside the paper to ensure transparency, accountability, and reproducibility.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Failure attribution in LLM multi-agent systems-identifying the agent and step responsible for task failures-provides crucial clues for systems debugging but remains underexplored and labor-intensive. In this paper, we propose and formulate a new research area: automated failure attribution for LLM multi-agent systems. To support this initiative, we introduce the Who&When dataset, comprising extensive failure logs from 127 LLM multi-agent systems with fine-grained annotations linking failures to specific agents and decisive error steps. Using the Who&When, we develop and evaluate three automated failure attribution methods, summarizing their corresponding pros and cons. The best method achieves 53.5% accuracy in identifying failure-responsible agents but only 14.2% in pinpointing failure steps, with some methods performing below random. Even SOTA reasoning models, such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek R1, fail to achieve practical usability. These results highlight the task's complexity and the need for further research in this area. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/mingyin1/Agents_Failure_Attribution

This report presents the Prime Collective Communications Library (PCCL), a novel fault-tolerant collective communication library designed for distributed ML workloads over the public internet. PCCL introduces a new programming model that enables dynamic peer joining and failure recovery. The library implements efficient collective operations like all-reduce while providing robust fault tolerance mechanisms that allow the system to continue operating even when peers fail or join during ongoing operations. We demonstrate that PCCL's design enables practical solutions to dynamic membership challenges in workloads with repeated operations and deterministic state advancement. Our implementation passes extensive stress tests across all major operating systems, showing reliable operation even under rapid peer churn and concurrent collective operations. By dispatching to multiple connections, we can efficiently utilize cross-continental long-fat-pipe TCP WAN links, in our experiments achieving up to 45 Gbit/s of bandwidth utilization across Europe and 25 Gbit/s across North America and Europe. PCCL's architecture enables easy implementation of distributed low-communication optimization strategies like DiLoCo, which significantly reduce communication frequency. Combined with quantization, this leads to a significant reduction in the bandwidth required for distributed training workloads. PCCL also allows for concurrent collective operations, which enables optimization strategies like async DiLoCo, which can completely hide communication overhead by implementing one-step delayed parameter updates. PCCL can facilitate exact bit-parity of the shared state across peers in all cases induced by graceful or abrupt peer churn. While PCCL exposes a C99 API, Python bindings are available which are compatible with PyTorch alongside FSDP. PCCL is available under the open source MIT license.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are critical for automating complex tasks, yet their practical deployment is severely hampered by the challenge of failure attribution. Current diagnostic tools, which rely on statistical correlations, are fundamentally inadequate; on challenging benchmarks like Who\&When, state-of-the-art methods achieve less than 15\% accuracy in locating the root-cause step of a failure. To address this critical gap, we introduce the first failure attribution framework for MAS grounded in multi-granularity causal inference. Our approach makes two key technical contributions: (1) a performance causal inversion principle, which correctly models performance dependencies by reversing the data flow in execution logs, combined with Shapley values to accurately assign agent-level blame; (2) a novel causal discovery algorithm, CDC-MAS, that robustly identifies critical failure steps by tackling the non-stationary nature of MAS interaction data. The framework's attribution results directly fuel an automated optimization loop, generating targeted suggestions whose efficacy is validated via counterfactual simulations. Evaluations on the Who\&When and TRAIL benchmarks demonstrate a significant leap in performance. Our method achieves up to 36.2\% step-level accuracy. Crucially, the generated optimizations boost overall task success rates by an average of 22.4\%. This work provides a principled and effective solution for debugging complex agent interactions, paving the way for more reliable and interpretable multi-agent systems.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems are challenging to debug because failures often arise from long, branching interaction traces. The prevailing practice is to leverage LLMs for log-based failure localization, attributing errors to a specific agent and step. However, this paradigm has two key limitations: (i) log-only debugging lacks validation, producing untested hypotheses, and (ii) single-step or single-agent attribution is often ill-posed, as we find that multiple distinct interventions can independently repair the failed task. To address the first limitation, we introduce DoVer, an intervention-driven debugging framework, which augments hypothesis generation with active verification through targeted interventions (e.g., editing messages, altering plans). For the second limitation, rather than evaluating on attribution accuracy, we focus on measuring whether the system resolves the failure or makes quantifiable progress toward task success, reflecting a more outcome-oriented view of debugging. Within the Magnetic-One agent framework, on the datasets derived from GAIA and AssistantBench, DoVer flips 18-28% of failed trials into successes, achieves up to 16% milestone progress, and validates or refutes 30-60% of failure hypotheses. DoVer also performs effectively on a different dataset (GSMPlus) and agent framework (AG2), where it recovers 49% of failed trials. These results highlight intervention as a practical mechanism for improving reliability in agentic systems and open opportunities for more robust, scalable debugging methods for LLM-based multi-agent systems. Project website and code will be available at https://aka.ms/DoVer.

Training large-scale language models is increasingly critical in various domains, but it is hindered by frequent failures, leading to significant time and economic costs. Current failure recovery methods in cloud-based settings inadequately address the diverse and complex scenarios that arise, focusing narrowly on erasing downtime for individual tasks without considering the overall cost impact on a cluster. We introduce Unicron, a workload manager designed for efficient self-healing in large-scale language model training. Unicron optimizes the training process by minimizing failure-related costs across multiple concurrent tasks within a cluster. Its key features include in-band error detection for real-time error identification without extra overhead, a dynamic cost-aware plan generation mechanism for optimal reconfiguration, and an efficient transition strategy to reduce downtime during state changes. Deployed on a 128-GPU distributed cluster, Unicron demonstrates up to a 1.9x improvement in training efficiency over state-of-the-art methods, significantly reducing failure recovery costs and enhancing the reliability of large-scale language model training.

Deep Research Agents (DRAs) aim to automatically produce analyst-level reports through iterative information retrieval and synthesis. However, most existing DRAs were validated on question-answering benchmarks, while research on generating comprehensive reports remains overlooked. Worse, current benchmarks for report synthesis suffer from task complexity and subjective metrics -- this fails to reflect user demands and limits the practical utility of generated reports. To address these gaps, we present Fine-grained DEepResearch bench (FINDER), an enhanced benchmark consisting of 100 human-curated research tasks with 419 structured checklist items that standardize report structure, analytical depth, and factual grounding. Based on approximately 1,000 reports produced by mainstream DRAs, we further propose Deep rEsearch Failure Taxonomy (DEFT), the first failure taxonomy for deep research agents. DEFT contains 14 fine-grained failure modes across reasoning, retrieval, and generation, and is built upon grounded theory with human-LLM co-annotating and inter-annotator reliability validation. Our experimental findings reveal that current DRAs struggle not with task comprehension but with evidence integration, verification, and reasoning-resilient planning.